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1 Introduction
Research activities on the establishment, development, and maintenance of 
successful cooperation have grown considerably (see special issues on the subject 
in the Journal of Business Research, the Academy of Management Review, and 
the Journal of Management). Within this domain, a construct that has received 
particular attention with regard to B-2-B relationships is trust (Anderson and 
Narus, 1990; Ripperger, 1998). 
Empirical evidence in numerous articles and books has consistently shown 
that trust facilitates coordination (e.g., by replacing formal contracts), reduces 
conflicts, and enhances longevity within business relationships. Consequen-
tly, trust contributes to a decrease in control and coordination costs (see, e.g., 
Fukuyama, 1995; Roessl, 1996; Ripperger, 1998; Sydow and Windeler, 2003). In 
view of the profits the construct of trust yields, companies should pay particular 
attention to the trust-developing process and factors that lead to the evolution of 
trust. A profound knowledge of the evolution of trust and the determinants in the 
trust-developing process allows companies to exert influence specifically on the 
establishment, development, and maintenance of business relationships. 
Although a vast amount of literature naming trust as a determinant of per-
formance of interfirm cooperation exists (see, e.g., Adler, 2001; Ring and Van 
de Ven, 1992), the study of trust is often scant and underdeveloped. This study 
therefore aims to open the black box by conceptualising trust in interfirm co-
operation and systematising the determinants in the trust-developing process 
against the background of sociological perspectives (see Luhmann, 2000; 
Coleman, 1990) and principal-agent theoretical considerations. The paper is 
structured as follows. Based on the analysis of the deficits of the classical coor-
dination mechanisms market and hierarchy, in the second section of this paper, 
trust is presented as a third ideal-typical mechanism for coordinating coope-
rative relations. In the third section, the discussion of different types of trust 
against the background of their effectiveness concerning the establishment and 
maintenance of highly complex transaction relationships based on long-term 
objectives leads to a trust definition that takes the uncertainties of the trustor 
regarding the behaviour of the trustee within cooperation into account. In view 
of the profits the construct of trust yields, the trustor’s characteristics and si-
tuational perceptions that lead to the evolution of trust within cooperation are 
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tor enabling interfirm cooperation. 
However, questions as to the concept 
and determinants of trust still remain to 
be answered. Therefore, the main pur-
pose of this paper is to conceptualise 
trust within B-2-B relationships by dif-
ferentiating between its objective and 
subjective dimensions and by identi-
fying its determinants. In its conclusi-
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and trustee’s characteristics on trust-
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specifically on the establishment and 
maintenance of cooperative B-2-B re-
lationships.




Zaupanje je pomemben dejavnik, ki 
omogoča sodelovanje med podjetji. 
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znotraj odnosov med podjetji (B2B) 
z razlikovanjem njegovih objektivnih 
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ključku članek predstavlja model, ki 
predpostavlja učinke značilnosti tako 
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stega, ki zaupa, na razvoj zaupanja 
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omogoča podjetjem, da vplivajo na 
vzpostavitev in ohranjanje sodeloval-
nega odnosa med podjetji (B2B). 
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4certainties concerning the cooperation partner, the mode 
of action of the trustee’s characteristics in the trust-deve-
loping process is hypothesised in the fifth section. In the 
conclusion, the paper presents a model that conceptualises 
trust as a two-dimensional construct and hypothesises the 
effect of the trustee’s and trustor’s characteristics on the 
development of trust in cooperation. 
2 Coordination Mechanisms
The topic of interfirm cooperation is becoming increa-
singly important. Volatile markets as well as the possibili-
ties induced by the new technologies require strategies to 
ensure competitiveness. As the only enduring advantage 
stems from the ability to generate a continuous flow of 
new advantages (Harvey et al., 2001), flexibility in terms 
of being able to quickly adapt to changes (Volberda, 1996) 
is of particular importance. One strategy for flexible adap-
tation is to enter into interfirm cooperation (D’Aveni, 1995). 
Cooperative relationships are an important source of 
resources, learning, and thus competitive advantage (Arino 
et al., 2001; Hanna and Walsh, 2002). The advantages of 
business-to-business relationships arise from the functi-
oning coordination of the partners’ behaviour within the 
areas of the cooperation. Only if each partner in a coopera-
tive arrangement forgoes short-term opportunism and ad-
vantages in favour of common long-term objectives can the 
cooperative relationship lead to competitive advantages for 
each cooperation partner (Roessl, 1996). Hence, coopera-
tors make themselves and their success dependent on the 
behaviour of their cooperation partners (Wurche, 1994). 
In order to ensure his own benefit, the cooperator has to 
make sure that his partner acts in accordance with the coo-
peration agreement (i.e., in a cooperative manner; see, e.g., 
Spremann, 1990). This combination of dependence and un-
certainty concerning the partner’s behaviour (the principal-
-agent problem) makes it possible for the latter to act on 
his own behalf and to pursue short-term interests (instead 
of common long-term interests) without being subject to 
sanctions. The option of behaving unfairly towards the co-
operator without being detected, and not exhibiting the 
expected behaviour, is referred to as latitude of opportu-
nistic behaviour (Provan and Skinner, 1989; Dahlstrohm 
and Boyle, 1994; Noorderhaven, 1995; Wathne and Heide, 
2000; Williams, 2007). Two factors affect the probability 
that the existing latitude of opportunistic behaviour will be 
exploited: the attractiveness of the cooperation partner’s 
possibilities (monitoring gaps) for opportunistic behaviour 
and his inclination to behave opportunistically, from which 
the cooperator’s uncertainty concerning the partner’s 
behaviour stems.
How is it, then, that a cooperator is able to ensure that 
his cooperation partner behaves according to the rules 
stipulated ex ante? We have identified three ideal-typi-
cal mechanisms for governing the cooperation partners’ 
behaviour in interfirm relationships: (1) spontaneous be-
havioural governance based on the market mechanism, 
(2) hierarchical or mechanistic governance based on regu-
lation and sanctions (e.g., Williamson, 1991), and (3) he-
terarchical or organic governance based on trust (Roessl, 
1996; Osterloh and Weibel, 2000; Adler, 2001). Whereas 
the market mechanism ensures that the exchange partners 
behave opportunistically (thereby diminishing the uncer-
tainties about the other’s behaviour), the hierarchical and 
the heterarchical coordination mechanism aim to reduce 
the latitude of opportunistic behaviour. The coordinati-
on capacity of the market mechanism originates from the 
self-organisation of suppliers and demanders who strive to 
realise their own interests as quickly as possible. Therefore, 
the market mechanism, which is based on the pursuit of 
short-term advantages, cannot be the dominant coordinati-
on mechanism in a long-term transaction relationship (see, 
e.g., Ouchi, 1979; Fink et al., 2006). The behavioural deter-
mination by hierarchical governance (Provan and Skinner, 
1989; Dahlstrohm and Boyle, 1994; Noorderhaven, 1995; 
Wathne and Heide, 2000) is equally limited, depending on 
the context. Credible sanction threats (Buckley and Casson 
1988) require sufficient sanctioning powers on the part of 
the cooperator (e.g., pledge; see Backhaus, 1992), as well as 
the ex-ante knowledge of the desired behaviour of the co-
operation partner and its consequences (Eberl, 2004) and 
the ex-post identification of this behaviour (Dwyer et al., 
1987; Spremann, 1990; Backhaus, 1992) (for contingent 
claim contracts, see Heide and John, 1988). Furthermore, 
the successful hierarchical governance requires a consistent 
monitoring of the cooperation partner’s behaviour (i.e., the 
vitreous interaction partner). It has been shown that, as a 
dominant coordination mechanism, hierarchical governan-
ce is limited (organisational failure), especially in those 
areas of interfirm cooperation where the objectives cannot 
be programmed at all or only at prohibitively high transac-
tion costs (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Ripperger, 1998). 
Facing the deficits of market and hierarchy as coordinati-
on mechanisms within cooperative arrangements, coopera-
tion research has proposed an alternative mechanism that 
is particularly well suited as a coordination mechanism in 
situations of both market and organisational failure. This 
coordination mechanism is referred to as trust (e.g., Adler, 
2001).
3 Trust as a Coordination Mechanism
The discussion of trust as a coordination mechanism 
within cooperation requires the differentiation between 
instrumental and norm-based trust (Osterloh and Weibel, 
2000). Instrumental trust refers to the exogenous confor-
mity of the cooperation partner’s behaviour with the coo-
peration norms: It can be specified as behaviour based on 
rational considerations (Luhmann, 2000). The coopera-
tor trusts his cooperation partner because other possible 
behaviour than the expected one is less attractive for the 
latter (e.g., due to control, sanctions). In contrast, norm-ba-
sed trust is intrinsically motivated: The cooperator trusts 
his cooperation partner because he expects the latter to 
neglect the existing latitude of opportunistic behaviour, 
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5thus behaving in a cooperative manner. Therefore, the 
point of departure for norm-based trust is the cooperation 
partner’s perceived trustworthiness. A perception of high 
trustworthiness on the part of the cooperation partner may 
induce the cooperator to realise acts of trust. Such risky 
advance performance signals the cooperation partner that 
he has rendered himself unprotected due to the trust placed 
in him (Roessl, 1996). Although the latitude of oppor-
tunistic behaviour still exists in the case of norm-based 
trust—due to the absence of control and sanction mechani-
sms—the cooperator’s blanking out of the partner’s latitude 
of opportunistic behaviour reduces behavioural uncerta-
inty (Ripperger, 1998). By rendering himself unprotected 
towards the partner, the cooperator reduces the partner’s in-
clination to behave opportunistically; thus, uncertainty is 
further reduced (Roessl and Fink, 2006). 
This leads to the conclusion that the complexity of the 
cooperation arrangement and the risks concerning the coo-
peration partner’s behaviour can partly be absorbed through 
norm-based trust. By determining a common objective, the 
necessary contributions of the cooperation partner can be 
coordinated in order to achieve long-term objectives (McAl-
lister, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). This resolves the double 
contingency issue (Luhmann, 1984) and prevents the deve-
lopment of social dilemmas such as the prisoner’s dilemma 
from the outset (Ostrom, 1990). Furthermore, the strategy 
of evolving a business-to-business relationship based on 
norm-based trust enables the development and mainte-
nance of long-term transaction relationships. Due to both 
market and organisational failure, such relationships would 
otherwise (e.g., based on instrumental trust) not take place 
(Roessl, 1996; Adler, 2001).
Referring to these remarks about norm-based trust as 
a well-suited coordination mechanism in situations of both 
market and organisational failure, and with reference to 
sociological perspectives (see Luhmann, 2000; Coleman 
1990) and principal-agent theoretical considerations, trust 
is defined as the anticipation/assumption that the coo-
peration partner will—despite the absence of protection 
measures—behave in a cooperative manner allowing for 
a risky advance performance by waiving stipulated pro-
tection and control mechanisms to restrict the latitude of 
opportunistic behaviour. Thus, the trust decision has a two-
-dimensional structure: The decision to place norm-ba-
sed trust in the cooperation partner becomes manifest in 
acts of trust (e.g., refraining from implementing control 
and sanction mechanisms to ensure the desired cooperati-
on partner’s behaviour), which are motivated by a positive 
trust expectation (i.e., the expectation that the coopera-
tion partner is reliable and will voluntarily refrain from 
behaving opportunistically) (Ripperger, 1998). Since busi-
ness-to-business relationships are managed by individuals 
who act on behalf of their organisations, in this paper the 
issue of trust is examined at the individual level (see, e.g., 
Cummings and Bromiley, 1996; Child, 1998; Becerra and 
Gupta, 2003; Enke et al., 2007). 
4 Characteristics of the Trustor as Determinants of 
the Development of Trust within Cooperation
In view of the profits the construct of trust yields (see, 
e.g., Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Fukuyama, 1995; Sydow 
and Windeler, 2003), cooperating companies should pay 
particular attention to the factors that facilitate the evolution 
of trust. A profound knowledge of the determinants in 
the trust-developing process enables companies to exert 
influence specifically on the establishment, development, 
and maintenance of business-to-business relationships. 
In order to explain the construct of trust in the form of 
a theoretical model integrating the trustor’s personal cha-
racteristics and situational perceptions as variables that 
influence the decision calculus of the cooperator in his role 
as a trustor, a differentiation between subjective expecta-
tions and objectively observable behaviour is necessary. 
A decision to place norm-based trust in the cooperation 
partner exists if the cooperator places an act of trust (risky 
advance performance) and this placement was motivated by 
a positive trust expectation. However, not all cooperative 
behaviours are based on a positive trust expectation, and a 
positive trust expectation does not always lead to a coope-
rative behaviour. Therefore, cooperation is not necessarily a 
signal for trust, and trust is not always a sufficient condition 
for cooperation (Ripperger, 1998). 
Referring to the trust act, we can summarise that it 
becomes manifest in the risky advance performance and in 
refraining from the implementation of control and sanction 
mechanisms to reduce the cooperation partner’s latitude 
of opportunism: The trustor gives resources to the trustee 
(e.g., open and honest information), which the latter can 
use to create gains or losses for the cooperator. By making 
himself vulnerable through these specific investments, the 
trustor’s trust act constitutes a unilateral dependency on 
the trustee’s behaviour (Rousseau et al., 1998; Luhmann, 
2000). The trustee’s ability to cause losses on the part of 
the trustor and thus the trust risk are rooted in the electoral 
freedom of the trustee between honouring and betraying the 
trust decision (Coleman, 1990). The decision of the trustor 
to take the hold-up risk without protection is—among other 
factors—based on his risk propensity and his situational 
risk perception: As risk is inherent in trusting others, we 
hypothesise that the risk propensity will affect the likeliho-
od that the trustor will place a trust act positively (as shown 
in Figure 1). Moreover, we hypothesise that the situational 
risk perception will affect the likelihood the trustor will 
place a trust act negatively, because trusting in such situ-
ations goes along with higher risks (as shown in Figure 1). 
The risk perception involves the trustor’s beliefs about situ-
ation-specific likelihoods of gains and losses, neglecting the 
influence of the particular trustee (see, e.g., Coleman, 1990; 
Mayer et al., 1995). 
Apart from the risk propensity and the situational risk 
perception, we assume that the expectation that the trustee 
will voluntarily refrain from behaving opportunistically, 
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6and thus not misappropriating the trustor’s specific invest-
ments (Ripperger, 1998), affects the trust the trustor has for 
the trustee. Referring to this trust expectation, the coope-
rator has to decide whether the potential trustee is trust-
worthy; yet this characteristic is to a large extent concealed 
before entering into a trust-based relationship. The trust 
expectation therefore rests on the accredited intensity 
and stability of the trustee’s motivation. In the course of 
assessing the trustee’s behavioural intention, the trustor is 
confronted with subjective uncertainties concerning the 
latter’s real preferences as well as with objective uncertain-
ties concerning the effects of exogenous factors and the be-
havioural restrictions. 
In the context of reducing subjective uncertainties, 
the relevance of the trust propensity becomes apparent. 
We hypothesise that the propensity to trust as a personali-
ty trait will affect the likelihood the trustor will develop a 
positive trust expectation. The propensity to trust might be 
understood as the generalised willingness to trust others. 
As the trustor is confronted with limited information in 
the course of assessing the potential trustee’s trustworthi-
ness in a specific situation, he will develop generalised 
expectations based on past interactions with others (Rotter, 
1967). As substitute information, such generalised expec-
tations (i.e., the propensity to trust) can then influence the 
trust expectation in a specific situation (Currall and Judge, 
1995; Mayer et al., 1995). As the degree of the propensity 
to trust reflects the success of the trust strategy in the past, 
the expectation that the trustee will voluntarily refrain from 
behaving opportunistically will be higher as others have 
more reliably behaved towards him in similar situations in 
the past (as shown in Figure 1).
To sum up, we assume that not only the trust and risk 
propensity as personality traits of the trustor, but also the si-
tuational risk perception impact the trust formation process.
5 Characteristics of the Trustee as Determinants 
of the Development of Trust within Cooperation
Control and sanction mechanisms can only be waived if 
the trustor gets information from which he can infer it to be 
more likely that the trustee will act according to the trust 
expectation (Weiss, 1992). The trust expectation therefore 
is—in addition to the trustor’s trust propensity—mainly 
influenced by the trustee’s personal characteristics. Butler 
(1991) identified ten conditions as personal characteristics 
of the trustee that positively impact the trustor’s perception 
of the trustee’s trustworthiness in a specific situation: avai-
lability, capabilities, consistency, discreetness, fairness, 
integrity, loyalty, openness, promise fulfilment, and recep-
tivity. Another empirical study has shown that perceived 
capabilities, willingness, sincerity, integrity, tactfulness, 
and confidentiality are positively related to trust (Moorman 
et al., 1993). According to Mayer et al. (1995), ability, be-
nevolence, and integrity as characteristics of the trustee 
determine trustworthiness and therefore ultimately ensure 
that this person is more trusted.
Because of the overlapping contents between Butler’s 
‘Conditions of Trust Inventory’ and Mayer et al.’s ‘Factors 
of Trustworthiness’ (as shown in Figure 2), we forego a com-
prehensive description of Butler’s determinants. However, 
we will refer to them in the course of the following analysis 
of Mayer et al.’s determinants: Benevolence as a trust de-
terminant can be understood as “the extent to which a 
trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside 
Figure 1 Trustor’s Characteristics as Determinants Figure 2 Consolidation of Butler and Mayer et al.’s 
Determinants
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7from an egocentric profit motive” (Mayer et al., 1995: 718). 
Therefore, Butler’s factors of loyalty, openness, availability, 
and receptivity can be subsumed under the concept of be-
nevolence. However, Butler and Cantrell (1984), based on 
their experimental study, dilute the importance of loyalty 
and openness in the trust-developing process. The results 
of a study conducted by Davis et al. (2000) corroborate in 
turn their hypothesis that the perceived trustee’s benevolen-
ce influences the evolution of trust on the part of the trustor 
positively. As benevolence implies that the trustee does not 
vulnerate the trustor, even if there is a stimulus for doing so 
(Gambetta, 1988), this factor can be of relevance in interde-
pendent decision-making situations: However, benevolen-
ce is not a sine qua non condition: Within a trust relation 
the inclination towards opportunistic behaviour is reduced, 
so that the partner can blank out the other’s latitude for 
opportunistic behaviour and thus act despite this latitude 
of behaviour. The reduced inclination to behave opportuni-
stically arises from the actor’s mutual belief that the other 
does not want to endanger the relationship and the associ-
ated long-term objectives in favour of short-term advanta-
ges (due to self-interest in lieu of benevolence). Thus, the 
trustor can expect the trustee to behave in a trustworthy 
manner, even if he cannot observe the trustee’s benevolent 
orientation (Lindskold, 1978). To sum up, benevolence is 
not a sine qua non condition, yet the trustor will be more 
inclined to be vulnerable to the actions of a benevolent inte-
raction partner than to the actions of a partner whose bene-
volence is cast into doubt (Kee and Knox, 1970). 
The sine qua non condition for the development of a 
positive trust expectation on the part of the trusting coo-
perator is the perceived long-term orientation of the trustee 
(Anderson and Narus, 1990). The fulfilment of the trust 
expectation depends on two factors: the ability and the wil-
lingness of the trustee. Due to the information asymmetri-
es between the cooperation partners, the trustor is unsure 
whether the trustee is not only able to behave according to 
the trustor’s expectations, but is also willing to behave ac-
cordingly. The trustee’s long-term orientation reduces the 
trustor’s subjective uncertainties concerning the willin-
gness of the trustee (Ganesan, 1994). Due to his long-term 
orientation, the trustee relies on relational exchanges to 
maximise his profits over a series of transactions (short-
-term orientation is characterised by reliance on efficiencies 
of market exchanges to maximise the profit in single tran-
sactions). Because of this perceived orientation, the trustor 
expects the trustee to refrain from behaving opportunisti-
cally as such behaviour would collide with the long-term 
orientation being a prerequisite of successful cooperation. 
Therefore, as shown in Figure 3, we assume that long-term 
orientation positively influences—via the ‘trust expectati-
on’ dimension—the placement of a trust act.
The perception of the trustor “that the trustee adheres 
to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable” 
(Mayer et al., 1995: 719) defines the integrity of the trustee. 
Integrity as a trust determinant is mainly associated with 
the factors of discreetness, fairness, promise fulfilment, 
and consistency (Butler, 1991). The nucleus of integrity is 
that it enables the trustor to believe in the trustee’s promise 
to forgo short-term advantages in favour of long-term ad-
vantages. Contrary to benevolence, the trustor can base his 
perception of the trustee’s integrity not only on personal 
information from past interactions with the latter, but 
also on credible communications from third parties about 
the trustee (Mayer et al., 1995). The results of the study 
conducted by Davis et al. (2000) lead to the conclusion that 
the perceived integrity of the trustee is an important deter-
minant of the trust expectation.
Ability as a trust determinant can be understood as the 
sum of skills and characteristics of a trustee that enable him 
to have influence within some specific domain (Mayer et 
al., 1995). As previously mentioned, the trustor is unsure 
whether the trustee is not only willing to fulfil his expecta-
tion, but is also able to fulfil his expectation. If the trustor 
expects the trustee to possess the necessary skills to fulfil 
the intended tasks, he will be in favour of placing a trust act 
(Davis et al., 2000). Ability as a trust determinant impacts 
the trust act as its perception does not lead to the expecta-
tion that the trustee will voluntarily refrain from behaving 
opportunistically, but rather to the confidence in the 
trustee’s potential, which in turn motivates the placement 
of a trust act.
6 Conclusion
Summarising, we have modelled the decision to trust 
as a process that begins with a trust expectation and can 
finally result in a trust act. We have hypothesised that the 
expectation that the trustee will voluntarily refrain from 
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8behaving opportunistically is influenced by the benevolen-
ce, integrity, and long-term orientation of the trustee as well 
as by the trustor’s propensity to trust. Furthermore, we have 
assumed that the manifestation of a risky advance perfor-
mance and the refraining from implementing control and 
sanction mechanisms are influenced not only by the trust 
expectation, but also by the trustor’s risk propensity and the 
situational risk perception and the trustee’s ability.
Therefore, the model proposed in this paper explicitly 
considers both characteristics of the trustee as well as the 
trustor. It differentiates between subjective and objective 
dimensions of the construct and also differentiates trust 
from its determinants. 
Summing up, there are many areas in inter-organisatio-
nal studies in which trust has played a key role. Therefore 
it is of high relevance to identify the determinants of trust 
formation. We tried to meet the requirements stated by 
Mayer et al. (1995: 730), whereby the process through which 
trust develops should be further explored by conceptuali-
sing the construct of trust and by identifying and analysing 
the key role of determinants in the trust formation process 
within cooperations. 
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